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Abstract
This article offers a theory of the notion ‘reference culture’ by taking 
as major examples modernity and Europe. Both constitute reference 
cultures and while different are closely related. A certain entanglement 
took place between the emergence of modernity and the formation of 
European culture whereby the latter came to be one of the main carriers 
of modernity. However, they need to be separated in that Europe, while 
being the first major expression of modernity, is not the only embodi-
ment of modernity. Modernity can be termed a first-order reference 
culture and Europe a second-order one. While there have been many 
second-order reference cultures, the European one was an influential 
and powerful one, but it was also a temporary one. This article sets out 
the main features that define the specificity of Europe. Against accounts 
that emphasize a master narrative or an underlying cultural unity to 
Europe, it is argued that crucial to the making of Europe was the for-
mation of modes of communication that enabled common practices to 
develop across a range of different cultures. In this way, it is argued, 
Europe consolidated as a consequence less of endogenous factors than 
exogenous ones. Important, too, was the mobile nature of European 
culture which facilitated translation into other cultures and which was 
also receptive to modernity. The twentieth century has witnessed the 
emergence of other varieties of modernity and the global decline of the 
European model.
Keywords: culture, Europe, European history, modernity, multiple 
modernities
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Introduction
At the heart of the idea of Europe lies a certain paradox.1 On the one 
side, Europe has been a cultural reference point for many parts of the 
world since the eighteenth century and, on the other side, it does not 
itself have any essential singularity that would make it a reference cul-
ture. The period in which Europe became such a reference culture was 
indeed short, no earlier than the late eighteenth century and by the early 
twentieth century it had ceased to be the beacon for the world. This was 
a time in which the rise of Europe roughly coincides with the emer-
gence of modernity. It is therefore reasonable to suppose there was a 
relation between the idea of Europe and the emergence of modernity. 
However, that relation is by no means clear and it cannot be assumed 
that modernity sprung from within Europe or that there was no relation. 
Europe signifies specificity while modernity invokes universality. The 
claim of European universality cannot be seriously entertained and nor 
can the reduction of modernity to Europe. In this paper I would like 
to try to resolve the apparent paradox by asking three questions. What 
are the defining features of Europe that provide its singularity or dis-
tinctiveness? Which of these features, if any, constitute the matrix of a 
reference culture? What is modernity and of what does its relation to 
Europe consist?
The argument advanced in this article is that neither Eurocentric 
approaches that stress either the exemplarity or exceptionality of Europe 
nor postcolonial arguments offer adequate accounts of European his-
tory. It is possible to identify the singularity of Europe without recourse 
to purely internalist accounts of its history that ignore the relation to 
the non-European world; it is also possible to identify logics of devel-
opment that cannot be entirely explained by reference to the elements 
typically highlighted by postcolonial theorizing. Indeed, the formative 
influences of the non-European world precede the age of imperialism 
and cannot be entirely accounted for by overseas colonization. Those 
than can be attributed to colonization constitute an important strand, 
but only one of many. But one of these looms large: namely the ‘dis-
covery’ of what came to be known as America. This event opened up a 
new imaginary for Europe, which prepared the ground for modernity. It 
symbolized a world that was new and with this came limitless possibili-
ties for the future, which ultimately were to reside outside Europe. This 
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was the paradox of Europe’s discovery of the modern world, a discov-
ery that, as has often been noted, was also a conquering of the world.
The Singularity of Europe
Accounts of the singularity of Europe are faced with two difficulties. 
The first is the problem of separating the history of Europe from the his-
tory of its constituent units, namely nations or empires out of which it 
consolidated. For most histories, the history of Europe is the history of 
its nations.2 Whether there is a history of Europe as such has been gen-
erally either rejected or avoided in mainstream historiography. Indeed, 
most accounts of the idea of Europe stress discontinuities and divisions.3 
The notion of unity in diversity has been one response to this problem. 
The appeal of the notion can undoubtedly be attributed to its vagueness. 
Yet, it also encapsulates the divergent trends in the making of Europe.
The other problem is the external perspective on Europe in its rela-
tion with the wider world. This has become increasingly important 
in global and transnational history. Separating Europe from the non-
European world is by no means clear-cut since much of European his-
tory happened in other parts of the world and that which we take to be 
Europe today includes areas that in earlier times were not considered 
to be European. European overseas colonialism from the sixteenth cen-
tury to the late nineteenth century has been formative of many other 
histories and, we are increasingly accepting, formative of European 
history. Moreover, as is now well established, the geopolitical limits 
of Europe have shifted many times in history, such that it is not pos-
sible to say by recourse to geography of what it consists. So there is 
therefore something unsatisfactory in the conventional approach to the 
history of Europe in terms of a history of nations and the contradictory 
assumption of the relative coherence of Europe when it comes to the 
wider world. How is it that the only unity that can be found consists of 
a difference between Europe and the non-European world, when within 
Europe there are only differences? Despite these conceptual and meth-
odological problems the idea of Europe can be defined in ways that 
overcome this contradiction.
Suspending for the moment the second problem of the external ver-
sus internal definition of Europe, I shall address firstly the problem of 
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singularity versus commonality, as the solution to this may help with the 
second problem. Is there anything specific to the European heritage that 
gives to it a defining characteristic that marks it off from the historical 
experience of other parts of the world? Max Weber famously posed this 
question and found that the answer lay in the prevalence of a particular 
mode of rationality – the so-called ‘methodic manner of life’ – that was, 
he believed, most developed in Europe. Although often criticized for 
misreading other civilizations and using Europe as an evaluative refer-
ence, it is evident from a reading of the ‘Author’s Introduction’4 that he 
believed empirical inquiry leads to the conclusion that the main value 
spheres of life in Europe – economy, law, religion – were pervaded by 
a pronounced concern with rationality. While Weber’s approach can be 
questioned on many accounts, and not least his assumption of civili-
zations as relatively intact, he did not claim that Europe is culturally 
superior. However, one problem remains, namely his over-emphasis on 
rationality and the association of this with Europe.
Rather than highlighting one over-arching characteristic of Europe, 
it can instead be hypothesized that there have been five features of 
European history and more generally characteristics of the European 
heritage that can be singled out. The challenge is to avoid over-plu-
ralizing Europe, but also to avoid recourse to a metaphysical master 
narrative, as was once common. In rejecting such ‘grand narratives’, 
we still have the problem of finding an alternative narrative. Perhaps 
the sceptic will argue we do not need narratives. This may be true, but 
we need ways of making sense of the past. Such sense-making does 
not necessarily need to take the form of a master-narrative. Nor does it 
need to take the form of a search for an essential trait, such as rational-
ity. Indeed, many of the features to be discussed below are not in them-
selves necessarily exclusively European. Instead, what is more signifi-
cant is the combination that resulted. The fact that at various points in 
history these features combined to produce distinctive constellations or 
cultural models is, in the final analysis, what gave Europe shape and 
thus what might be said to be a part of its defining nature.
The first feature of European history that can be singled out is the 
fact that no single power ever gained supremacy for long. This has been 
a central feature of European history that had enduring formative con-
sequences for the making of Europe. It is also why out of the plurality 
of very similar powers no European-wide nation or state emerged. The 
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European historical experience has been one in which a plurality of city 
states, small regional states, territorial empires, and later nation-states 
dominated with none ever gaining total supremacy and none enduring 
for long.5 These states, despite their differences, had remarkable simi-
larities, with inter-marriages between the royal households the norm and 
common practices of government and in warfare. Yet, no common state 
emerged from these lineages. The Roman Empire was the first major 
political order, but it can only with difficulty be equated with Europe, 
since it was more of a Mediterranean empire. It would be more accurate 
to say Europe emerged out of the collapse of the Roman Empire, begin-
ning with its internal division into Greek eastern and western Latin 
parts. This early division formed the inner tension in later patterns of 
European history, which never led to a common European tradition. 
While this story can be told in terms of a history of divisions culmi-
nating in the Reformation and the wars of religion of the seventeenth 
century and the later wars of the twentieth century, it should also be 
seen in terms of a tension that gave to Europe a certain indeterminacy 
and the absence of path-dependency in its political structures. While 
wars between the various centres of power were of course common, so 
too was the balance of power system since 1648 and the unique rela-
tionship that was established earlier between church and state whereby 
an accommodation was achieved, such that the former never gained 
ascendancy over the state. It was an accommodation in which the state 
had the upper hand. The overall result of this was the absence of a cen-
tre of power. This does not mean that there were no centres, but that 
none of them was the dominant one. For this reason it is not possible to 
say where the centre of power lies. Perhaps today there is a new centre 
of power forming in Brussels and Frankfurt, but it is a recent develop-
ment with uncertain prospects. Indeed, the history of European integra-
tion fits well into this picture of a plurality of orders of powers.
Secondly, closely related to the previous point, another important 
feature of the European tradition was a strong tradition of civil society. 
Since the early Middle Ages local powers won rights against the nobil-
ity setting limits to the centralization of power. Elites had to negotiate 
power with organized civil society groups, such as merchants, craft-
workers, the intelligentsia, and later organized workers. This was most 
developed in the cities, in particular the autonomous cities. There the 
demands of organized guilds and non-state organizations checked the 
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growth of absolutism.6 The outcome can be described, as what Jeno 
Szücs in a classic essay has referred to as a ‘plurality of small free-
doms’.7 The structure of power institutionalized by Norman feudalism 
gave a foundation to legal and symbolic relations of mutual recogni-
tion whereby the ruler had to grant rights to those lower down in return 
for their obligations. The history of modern Europe was one in which 
civil society movements played a major role in shaping the direction of 
societal development. This is why in Europe many powerful political 
movements took off and had reverberations in other parts of the world, 
from republicanism and liberalism to conservatism, nationalism, social-
ism, anarchism, communism and fascism. The long-term consequence 
of civil society was that authority was constantly contested and that 
as a result of politicization it was difficult for any centre of power to 
endure. This point can be characterized as a constant tension between 
legality and legitimacy. The legality of any political order was always 
open to questioning from those who did not accept its legitimacy. This 
problem arises when new sources of authority emerge and challenge 
the legitimacy of the old order. The prevalence of civil society had the 
effect of constantly producing new claims to legitimacy. This undoubt-
edly had a democratizing effect in the long term, since it had the effect 
of setting limits to central state power, but it was not always necessar-
ily so in that such contestation must also be seen as a consequence of 
group interests.
Thirdly, the relation between the present time and the past was from 
very early on in the history of Europe one of periodic rupture. Within 
Christianity disputes over the scriptures and ecclesiastical authority set 
the terms for a tradition of disputes that was not confined to religion. The 
rise of Christianity itself was responsible for the break with antiquity, 
for in severing direct links with the pagan cultures of Greece and Rome 
the Christian Church established itself as the new, or the modern. It sev-
ered any connection with territory, since it was deemed to be a universal 
church. In becoming the common religion of Europe, it established a 
tension with the profane world, which Max Weber claimed to provide 
Europe with the basic impetus towards rationalism. The movements 
that shaped the later history of Europe, from the Middle Ages through 
the Renaissance and Enlightenment, shared this tendency towards the 
severance of the present from the past. To be sure, the Reformation 
and the Renaissance saw the present as deriving its legitimacy from 
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the recovery of an older past that if retrieved would allow the present 
to break free from the recent past. But this spirit of rebirth or revival of 
a more ancient mind was nonetheless a rejection of the preceding age. 
The later and more utopian movements of the seventeenth to nineteenth 
centuries, in bringing a more future oriented dimension to the European 
mind, developed this spirit of asserting the priority of present time over 
the past. This does not mean that the only common culture was one 
of re-interpreting the past, though I argue it was the most important 
legacy and was almost certainly more pronounced in Europe than else-
where, at least before the twentieth century when arguably moderniz-
ing currents elsewhere brought about major ruptures with the past (the 
October Revolution being the most striking example). Early medieval 
Christianity, despite its divisions and doctrinal disputes, laid the basis 
for common traditions throughout Europe in, for example, the tradition 
of Roman law, Latin, the names of the saints, diocesan organization, 
architecture, art and music etc.8 The theoretical point, then, is that con-
tinuity was achieved to a large degree through rupture, which made 
possible the reconstruction of the past in new forms.
Fourthly, closely related to the previously discussed point of the 
internal logic of development within European culture that led to the 
formation of a self-questioning attitude, an additional dimension to the 
European tradition can also be identified. This can be termed the double 
pursuit of individual and collective liberty. It has been widely regarded 
that the idea of the individual was invented in Europe. Morris traces 
individualism to the twelfth century.9 It was integral to Christianity, in 
the quest for individual salvation; it was the basis of European philoso-
phy and ethics. While the notion of the individual as such cannot be 
exclusively attributed to Europe, since similar ideas can be found in 
ancient Indian civilizations for example, what is perhaps more charac-
teristically European were the political implications that followed from 
the discovery of the individual. The emphasis on the individual, for 
instance, lent itself to the philosophy of liberalism and to the capitalist 
ethic. It was frequently in tension with the related pursuit of collective 
autonomy, which was another current in the European political tradition 
and which expressed itself in republicanism and in socialism. A feature 
of European political identity was precisely this tension between indi-
vidual and collective autonomy.
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Fifthly, the final aspect of the European heritage that can be high-
lighted is the cultivation of a world orientation. The Europeans were 
not the only ones who developed an interest in other peoples, but it is 
arguably the case that curiosity about other cultures was taken further 
in Europe. There was extensive borrowing of the culture of others, as 
has been much documented in recent years by global historians. Indeed, 
it is possible to argue that the most salient aspects of European science 
and technology were derived from other civilizations.10 European civi-
lization was itself constituted through centuries of cross-fertilization 
from other cultures, especially those of the East and the Mediterranean. 
Central to all of this was of course European colonization. While not all 
of European ventures to the furthest corners of the world were colonial 
ones, many were and this was one of the main ways in which Europe 
related not only to the non-European world but also to itself. Lying at 
the very source of Europe’s engagement with the world was the very 
notion of the world, which was considerably more developed in Europe 
than, for example, in China, where the world effectively was the world 
of the Middle Kingdom. For Europe, the world was not Europe; it was 
outside, as in the notion of the New World. Europeans sought to know 
this world and to master it both intellectually and politically. The map 
was not a European invention, but Europeans developed sophisticated 
cartographic techniques that made it possible to think of the world as 
a globe.11 The European discovery of what became known as America 
was the single greatest event that shaped the formation of the European 
worldview.12 Unlike the encounter with Asia, the encounter with 
America took the form of a ‘discovery’ that challenged the assumptions 
of a world ordered by Eurasian civilizations. It opened the way for the 
emergence of the wider category of the West, which ultimately reduced 
the place and significance of Europe.
The foregoing is obviously a limited characterization of some of 
the defining tenets of the European heritage. In highlighting these 
 elements – most of which have been variously noted by others – I have 
tried to foreground the absence of a common model of unity such as 
a common language, a notion of peoplehood, religion, and state. This 
approach to the European heritage is also a corrective of ‘essentialist’ 
arguments that seek to attribute an undue emphasis on any of these 
characteristics as constituting the basic soul or spirit of Europe. It is 
in this respect that the approach developed here differs from the more 
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Eurocentric accounts. Rather than emphasize any of these characteris-
tics as constituting a primary identity, the argument instead is that it was 
their combination that gave rise to a particular matrix – or set of cultural 
models – that was formative of modern Europe.
A pronounced trend in this matrix, which can also be termed civi-
lizational, has been towards plurality, which was reinforced by every 
drive towards unity, but which always led to the production of new 
differences. However, the notion of plurality presupposes logically a 
relation to a larger matrix or framework that is pluralized. Of what does 
this consist if it does not imply homogenization or a process of con-
vergence? Avoiding the poles of unity and diversity, without denying 
either, the point must be that similar logics of development unfolded 
at various points in Europe through systems of exchange whereby the 
above five characteristics evolved and combined in different ways, but 
with much the same effects. This means that in order for Europe to 
consolidate both as a consciousness and as a civilizational matrix, an 
interlinked system of communications must have existed. Europe was 
considerably more networked than other parts of the world due in part 
to its navigational rivers, trade routes, centres of learning from monas-
teries to universities, translations, map making, the early development 
of printing and the techniques for the manufacture of paper etc. The 
bourgeois culture of modernity, as Seigel has also shown, was based 
on networks that facilitated its diffusion.13 It was this that made Europe 
possible rather than a preordained structure or a common culture.14
A preliminary conclusion is that what is common in the history of 
Europe is not a shared culture or common institutional framework, but 
the existence of modes of communication that facilitated similar logics 
of development, such as developments related to the five points dis-
cussed in the foregoing. In this way the paradox of unity and diversity 
can be understood in more sociological terms. There are three aspects 
to this. Firstly, the more communication, the more difference since 
conduits of communication do not produce integration into a com-
mon framework or imply that people will draw the same conclusions 
from similar information. In fact they are more likely to draw different 
conclusions. Like players in a game, each seeks to win but by playing 
according to common rules. Thus common rules lead to diverse out-
comes. This is the sense in which the unity of Europe might be best con-
ceived, a unity that came from the adoption of common practices across 
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a range of institutions in different geographical areas. This produced 
modes of integration that while differing in their design and cultural 
contexts were nonetheless remarkably similar. A pertinent example is 
the case of the adoption of the nation-state and the very idea of the 
nation, which is arguably a European invention and a characteristic of 
Europe and which paradoxically at the same time was the very political 
form that gave rise to conflict and warfare.
Secondly, the outcome, especially with regard to the above five 
elements, is not simply the passing on of a message unchanged, but 
a reinterpretation of previous systems of thought with which often 
went an attitude of self-transformation: in the terms of both Weber and 
of Foucault, ‘transform thyself’ was often the message. Against the 
Eurocentric assumption of a foundational origin – a spirit of a founding 
subject – that provides later eras with the basic blueprint, instead the 
only constants are simply diverse reference points that provide indi-
viduals with the tools to construct identities. In science, in ethics and 
in religion this was the developmental logic of European culture that 
became all the more proliferate due to the interlinked nature of Europe.
Thirdly, facilitated by networks of communication an imaginary 
Europe took shape relatively early (before a comparable development 
took place in other parts of the world). Europeans could thus imagine 
Europe as a continent and as a civilization. This was aided in no small 
way by the decline of Christendom and its substitution by the idea of 
Europe as a surrogate symbolic world. The capacity to imagine a larger 
world, the world of Europe, made it possible for Europeans to imagine 
the still larger entity of the world as a globe. This had potentially cos-
mopolitan dimensions in opening the European mind to other universes 
of meaning. In the era before colonization cosmopolitan currents were 
important expressions of this cognitive development. Indeed, it is argu-
ably the case that they preceded both nation and empire. This is espe-
cially the case in Germany where cosmopolitanism preceded the forma-
tion of national consciousness, according to Meinecke’s famous thesis 
in 1907.15 However, there can be little doubt that these currents were 
later reversed by the stronger waters of nationalism and colonialism.
In sum, it was dense and durable networks of communication that 
created the conditions for the possibility of something that can be 
called Europe. These networks make possible ultimately the extension 
of Europe beyond itself and to the translocation of Europe to many 
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parts of the world. This points in the direction of a mobile conception 
of European culture, namely a kind of culture that is not tied to a foun-
dational origin. What is offered here is a sociological thesis about the 
explanatory significance of networks of communication and an argu-
ment that this made possible the diffusion of modes of thought and 
practices that tended to increase contestation. The result was a plurality 
of cultural and political sites, but this was possible only because of the 
matrix of exchanges that consolidated.
Figure 1: Map showing the telegraph lines in operation, under contract, and 
contemplated, to complete the circuit of the globe by H.H. Lloyd & Co. Publisher, 
(1872) (https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Map_showing_the_telegraph_lines_
in_operation,_under_contract,_and_contemplated,_to_complete_the_circuit_of_the_
globe_(8346430055).jpg, Norman B. Leventhal Map Centre).
The Making of a Reference Culture
Europe became a reference culture from the late eighteenth century, but 
this was above all a development of the nineteenth century. Before the 
mid-eighteenth century Europe was a marginal part of the world. The 
civilizations of Asia, especially in China and India, and the Ottoman 
Empire were the main centres of the world, which had its centre of grav-
ity in the Indian Ocean. To sum up a now well-known story that has been 
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best told by Pomeranz, a ‘great divergence’ occurred by which Europe 
outpaced Asia. In revising the traditional account of the Rise of the West, 
Pomeranz and other global historians have demonstrated that this took 
place much later than previously thought.16 This is a significant argument 
in that it challenges the traditional view of the uniqueness of Europe 
as something that can be attributed to its own achievements, an inner 
essence, and that its formation had little or nothing to do with the rest of 
the world. In short, the rise of the West cannot any longer be accounted 
for entirely in endogenous terms, for the relation to the non-European 
world was critical. This also accounts for the making of a reference cul-
ture, as I shall clarify below. However, the global contextualization of 
Europe in accounts such as those of Pomeranz, while correcting the old 
view of the rise of the West, does not tell us much about the European 
heritage, other than that it happened later than previously believed. Other 
studies in transnational history paint a picture of an interconnected world 
rather than one of largely separated or intact cultures.17
Much of the debate has focussed on Europe’s relation to Asia. The 
encounter with the New World was also important and very different in 
that Europeans did not discover civilizations in the north comparable to 
those in Asia; in central and south America it was different, but there 
two of the three main civilizations were defeated (the Aztec and Incas) 
and the third (the Mayan) had already gone into decline by the time of 
the Spanish conquest. The Portuguese, who did not initially set out to 
conquer the new lands, had only nomadic tribes to deal with, the ‘peo-
ple without writing’, as Lévi-Strauss was later to term them. The subse-
quent conquest of America by the western sea-based European powers 
– Spain, Portugal, England, France and the Netherlands – was very dif-
ferent from the conquest of parts of Asia in that it was complete, while 
much of Asia was unconquered or partially. In contrast to the conquest 
of Africa – which occurred much later and was only complete by the 
end of the nineteenth century – the conquest of the New World, while 
complete, was temporary. The republican temperament rose early and 
quickly severed direct political subservience to the Old World, which 
by the early nineteenth century had undertaken its own course.
There are a number of conclusions that can be reached from the his-
tory of European colonization and exploration in Asia and in the New 
World that help to explain the rise of Europe as a reference culture. With 
regard to the New World, the significant factor here lies in the formation 
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of new settler societies that initially at least were composed of Europeans 
who brought with them the cultural and social values and institutions of 
the home countries.18 While these quickly changed to suit the circum-
stances of the new lands, an enduring cultural legacy was forged that 
tied the New World to the Old at the time that it severed its political ties. 
The divergence of the Old and the New Worlds is most evident in the 
rise of the republican idea. While it germinated in Europe, growing out 
of the old European culture and Roman political legacy, it developed 
in innovative ways in the New World, and above all in Latin America. 
Some of the most important developments in republican thinking took 
place there leading to the loss of Spanish dominion. The later develop-
ment of republicanism in Brazil, and the confluence there of republican-
ism and positivism, led to a reversal in the relation of crown and col-
ony.19 Europe served as a reference culture for the development of new 
political ideas that took on a distinct form in the New World and which, 
when exported back to Europe, had a radicalizing effect. For instance, 
the influence of Latin American republicanism on Spain at the end of 
the nineteenth century or the influence of the American revolution in 
Europe and above all in France, and the influence of the Haitian revolu-
tion on post-Revolutionary France. Europe may have been a reference 
culture, but it was also transformed as a result of the interpretations that 
were made of its own ideas. This confluence of Europe with modernity 
should not lead to the conclusion that they were coeval, despite their co-
emergence: the formation of modernity in Latin America, despite (or in 
spite of) the European impetus, was an endogenous development of the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries and cannot be entirely accounted for 
by the European variant of modernity.
In Asia it is a more complicated story since (European) settler 
societies generally did not develop and the imperial mission was dif-
ferent from that in the New World. Those parts that were colonized 
by Europeans were often only partially and European culture never 
entirely replaced native culture. This is true too of India, where the 
British Empire established a policy of rule through local elites. The 
most significant factor in explaining the appropriation of European 
ideas in Asia was internal change within the political system. In China 
within a short time, from circa 1912 to 1915 a major shift occurred in 
Chinese political thinking whereby it became impossible to continue to 
appeal to the idea of the ‘mandate from heaven’. In place of the emperor 
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as the source of political power was the new idea of the republic.20 Sun 
Yat Sen, who succeeded in bringing about this shift more than anyone 
else, thus introduced a European theme that had huge implications for 
subsequent Chinese history. This occurred at a time of openness to new 
ideas and when Chinese elites sought to find new solutions for state-
craft. It was not of course a wholescale transplantation of a European 
idea, but a Chinese adaptation and it was accompanied by the rejection 
of other aspects of European culture, such as imperialism.
The appropriation of the republican idea in Turkey at much the same 
time by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk is another remarkable example of the 
power of the republican imagination in a civilization that had hitherto 
been very different from the European one. As the Ottoman Empire 
crumbled, the idea of the republic, imported from France, was used to 
bring about a huge shift in the locus of power from the Muslim Sultan 
to the secular republic. Western culture was adopted by the elite and 
republican government and was selectively introduced in societies that 
were otherwise unprepared for such ideas, leading inevitably to very 
different outcomes. As in the case of China and Brazil, it was not a 
wholescale importation, but a modified one, which in this case was 
combined with elements of socialism and fascism. In Europe the repub-
lican tradition rarely articulated socialist ideas.
In Japan, earlier, at the time of the Meiji Reform in 1868 a similar 
moment of openness occurred when European ideas were for the first 
time introduced, following a long period of closure.21 However, the use 
that was made of those ideas was determined by Japanese culture and 
only selective appropriation was effected, thus ensuring that the intro-
duction of new ideas would not lead to major social and political trans-
formation, as was the case in China, which embarked on a period of 
revolution, while in contrast to China, Japan generally opted for gradual 
reform.
Other examples to illustrate the proliferation of Europe as a refer-
ence culture would include Christianity – though in its origin it was not 
European it effectively became a Europeanized religion – Marxism in 
its various incarnations, and liberalism. While many examples can be 
found of how European culture was forcibly and brutally imposed on 
other parts of the world, as the case of the imposition of Christianity fol-
lowing conquest, force does not explain some of the most wholescale 
appropriations of European ideas, such as Marxism in late imperial 
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Russia and its subsequent adoption in China. What was it about Europe 
that led to it having such global influence? Why did not the reverse 
occur? Until now endogenous factors have been stressed rather than the 
power of European culture in order to account for the appropriation of 
European ideas. However, this does not fully account for the making of 
the European reference culture. The global spread of ideas of European 
origin can be explained by two additional factors.
The worldwide diffusion of European ideas can be partly accounted 
for by the fact that there was a certain co-emergence of European 
consciousness and of modernity. This resulted in Europe becoming 
equated with modernity. However, it must be clearly established that 
while Europe did become a reference culture for much of the rest of the 
world, it did not exhaust the nature of modernity. Here a key point is 
that Europe fairly early developed – certainly long before the so-called 
Rise of the West – the basic elements of a world culture, that is a cul-
tural matrix that lent itself to cultural translation. This is because the 
key elements of European culture are themselves translations, having 
evolved out of earlier appropriations of ideas that were not themselves 
European. The fact itself that much of European culture was transmitted 
through translations, including Arabic translations is a striking illustra-
tion of the role of translation in not simply transmitting culture but in 
transforming it.22 More than this, those aspects of European culture that 
were appropriated by the rest of the world were characterized precisely 
by a propensity for translation in that they lent themselves to diverse 
interpretations. It can of course be argued that all of culture is a transla-
tion and that all other world cultures are formed from the logic of trans-
lation. There is nothing specific to Europe about this. However, what 
may be regarded as a feature of the European heritage is that the logic 
of translation appears to have undermined the possibility of an enduring 
culture, producing instead less durable constellations and a culture of 
critique that undermined Europe from within.
It was paradoxically this tendency that made possible the forma-
tion of Europe itself: by dint of the proliferation of networks of com-
munication, Europe consolidated through the diffusion of particular 
notions of, for instance, individual and collective liberty, ideas about the 
nature of rights and political obligation. What differed was how these 
ideas were interpreted and combined, but critical was that the defining 
elements lacked cultural particularity. Indeed, the most utopian of all 
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Europe’s ideas, Marxism, found more resonance in other civilizations 
than in Europe, while the messianic elements within Christianity found 
an expression in North America where it became the legitimating basis 
of a new empire that appealed to the doctrine of American exceptional-
ism. The thesis advanced in this article then is that European culture 
was not particularly European and it was this that lent itself to what 
can be described as cultural translation. This had both a negative and 
a positive outcome for the societies that it encountered. It had negative 
consequences in that it led to many non-European societies misrecog-
nizing their own modernity by simply imitating what they judged to be 
authentic modernity. There were undoubtedly positive outcomes of a 
cosmopolitan nature in achieving mutual dialogue with other cultures 
and in cultivating greater understanding between societies, as reflected 
for example in the writings and work of Alexander von Humboldt, the 
opposition to slavery and the cultivation of what Kant termed the ethic of 
hospitality. In other words, an enduring feature of the legacy of Europe 
was its transnational tendency. It frequestly became entangled in other 
cultures and led to hybrid outcomes, but within Europe and beyond.
European culture then was a mobile culture.23 Europeans were rel-
atively mobile, but the culture they created was yet more mobile. A 
related contributory factor was that expansion, both demographically 
and militarily, in the new centres of economic power in the West, was 
forced outwards beyond Europe. Ottoman supremacy closed off the 
possibility of expansion in the near east. The result was an impetus 
towards overseas expansion and a preference for a balance of power 
within Europe, a balance that was as precarious as the balance that was 
sought between capital and labour.
Modernity and its Relation to Europe
The other factor that accounts for the global diffusion of European cul-
ture is the emergence of modernity. Modernity is not European, but a 
condition that can arise in any society or civilization. It has been much 
associated with Europe, but this view can be criticized for reducing 
modernity to its European expression. Habermas, for example, has char-
acterized modernity in terms of a conflict between two kinds of ration-
ality, the instrumental rationality of capitalism and communicative 
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rationality. In this account, the ‘project of modernity’ is about com-
municative reason resisting power and domination.24 He rejects the 
postmodern thesis of modernity becoming obsolete as well as the pes-
simistic scenario of Weber and the Frankfurt School, for whom moder-
nity has become an ‘iron cage’. Instead, modernity, which begins with 
the internal pluralization of cultural value spheres, as Weber following 
Kant argued, continues to have relevance so long as communicative 
forms of rationality exist and have the capacity to challenge power. 
However this account is limited by a tendency to see modernity as a 
product of Europe and does not give sufficient recognition that moder-
nity can take other forms. There is nothing specifically European about 
the features that Habermas attributes to modernity other than that they 
first emerged in Europe and took on a European-specific form.
In the past two decades or so there has been a huge literature on 
modernity as a plural phenomenon. Much of this derives from the path-
breaking work of S.N. Eisenstadt, who developed the notion of ‘mul-
tiple modernities’ based on different civilizational trajectories.25 The 
older assumptions of modernity as essentially a product of European 
or western civilization have been much criticized in wider-ranging 
scholarship that has emerged from, for instance, comparative histori-
cal sociology, transnational and global history, postcolonial theory, and 
cosmopolitanism. This is not the place for a review of these trends. 
However it can be remarked that while Eisenstadt gave the notion of 
modernity a wider and more global relevance, the tendency in recent 
years has been less centred on its civilizational characteristics in so far 
as these relate to the emergence of the major Eurasian civilizations of 
the Axial Age. Eisenstadt’s own work also gave the European variant of 
modernity undue significance in shaping other varieties of modernity. 
The civilizational dimension cannot be entirely neglected in any kind 
of global comparison, as wide-ranging scholarship has recognized.26 
The multiple forms that modernity takes can be related to civilizational 
trajectories, but greater recognition is required of endogenous logics of 
development and the entanglement of these with exogenous ones. Yet, 
the problem of what modernity consists still remains. It is not enough 
to postulate multiple or entangled variants.
What is modernity? It is best defined as a condition of awareness that 
nothing is settled for once and for all and that therefore the future is not 
predetermined. It expresses the idea that the present is not determined 
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by the past, especially by the recent past. Most invocations of moder-
nity announced a rupture of present time from the past, generally the 
recent past. The modern is the present time; it is the ‘now’ and ‘the 
new’. The consciousness of the new is common to most cultural, phil-
osophical and political expressions of modernity from the eighteenth 
century onwards. The modernist movement in literature, the arts and 
architecture strongly emphasized a spirit of newness and the break from 
tradition. The social and political ideas of what Koselleck referred to as 
the Sattelzeit, the period from 1750 to 1850, provide the main reference 
points for modernity, the Neuzeit.27 This period, which saw the forma-
tion of key conceptual and structural changes, made possible the emer-
gence of modern society as a new kind of society that sought to reach 
beyond itself, beyond what had previously been contained within the 
‘space of experience’. In the terms of Koselleck, the ‘horizon of expec-
tation’ was considerably expanded beyond the ‘space of experience’, 
which was also broadened. The discovery of the notion of ‘progress’ in 
this period, which he attributes to Kant, marks the point at which new 
expectations become possible and are not limited by previous experi-
ence. For Koselleck experience and expectation are key registers of a 
shift in historical consciousness. Koselleck’s theory of the emergence 
of modernity in terms of a particular kind of time consciousness has 
been very influential. It suggests a notion of modernity that is defined in 
categorical terms rather than reducing it to a particular period or epoch. 
The Sattelzeit can be seen as the period when modernity took shape in 
Europe but is not confined to this period. However, Koselleck’s account 
conflates modernity with its European expression. As argued through-
out this article, despite their co-emergence and entanglement, they need 
to be conceptually separated. One aspect of the notion of modernity 
that is striking is that it reflects a strong faith in the capacity of human 
agency to shape society in light of guiding ideas and in knowledge. This 
is not a specifically European idea.
Wagner, drawing on Castoriadis, has developed an approach to 
modernity that draws on the multiple modernities approach, while 
departing from it in a number of ways. Modernity, he argues, is marked 
by a continuous search for new answers to key challenges relating to 
social and political order.28 In his account, the plurality of forms of 
modernity are responses to central ‘problemátiques’ that all modern 
societies seek to answer. Modernity is neither universal nor uniform 
EUROPE AND THE EMERGENCE OF MODERNITY
HCM 2015, VOL. 3, NO. 3 27
but an on-going process of interpretations in light of experiences made 
earlier. In this account, there are three over-arching interpretative ques-
tions: an epistemic one, a political one and an economic one, referring 
respectively to what kind of shared knowledge a society rests on, how 
to create rules for a common social life, and how to establish the rules 
to solve the basic material needs of society. What is finally common to 
all varieties of modernity is also what defines the specificity of their dif-
ferent ‘societal self-understandings’: all societies need to find answers 
to these ‘problemátiques’ in their own ways. The condition of moder-
nity is thus radical contingency and uncertainty in that these ‘problemá-
tiques’ are open to interpretations and thus different answers will be 
found in different societal contexts. Thus the formation of modernity 
throughout the world, in the north and in the south, will be very differ-
ent. The implication of this view is that modernity is not a specifically 
European condition.
In drawing attention to key problems or questions modern societies 
have to address, and which define the condition of modernity, Wagner 
solves a problem that beset other approaches that addressed the plural-
ity of modernity. In this way he avoids either universalizing European 
modernity or pluralizing it to a point that it becomes meaningless. 
However, there are two limitations to this analysis. The first is that it 
does not discuss the interaction of different formations of modernity, 
since they do not simply develop endogenously but develop in close 
interaction. It still needs to be explained how such ‘problématiques’ 
arise. Moreover, though the answers that are found vary greatly, the fact 
is that many answers are quite similar. In view of the worldwide domi-
nance of Europe in the nineteenth century, it is difficult not to conclude 
that the European variant gained dominance for a time and influenced 
the shape that other forms assumed. This was in no small part due to 
the fact that it was the first major location of the emergence of moder-
nity. Earlier expressions of modernity in other parts of the world were 
undoubtedly influenced in part or in whole by the European model, 
which in many cases was either the French or British variant. A sec-
ond limitation is that it does not fully account for shifts in the moral 
and political horizons of societies. In other words, it does not offer a 
critical normative position of what is at stake in such models of moder-
nity. This is generally a problem with the multiple modernities concept, 
which operates within an interpretative framework of analysis and is 
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not concerned with developmental logics. It cannot be denied that some 
models of modernity are more successful than others in solving societal 
problems, such as the key questions that Wagner identifies. To explore 
this further is beyond the scope of the present article. It can however be 
remarked that modernity is also about the raising of normative claims, 
such as the vision of a better world. An account of modernity that seeks 
to correct the Eurocentrism of the classical conceptions must not lose 
sight of this dimension that gives a more central place to knowledge 
and cognition.
As highlighted by Wagner, one of the most important expressions of 
modernity is the use of knowledge. This can be understood in two senses; 
knowledge in the sense of science and science-directed public policy; 
and knowledge in the sense of, what Strydom from the perspective of 
cognitive sociology refers to as, cognitive principles or modes of thought 
or reason that open up modern societies to new potentials.29 Modernity 
is a condition in which new structures develop that allow ideas or prin-
ciples to guide human action in finding answers to some of the key chal-
lenges facing all societies. While Wagner stresses three key questions or 
‘problématiques’, I am emphasizing a framework of cognitive reference 
points that when realized in specific cultural models made possible devel-
opmental logics. For this reason modern societies are dynamic, prone to 
contestation and marked by constant transformation by human agency. 
The concrete forms of modernity vary hugely depending on the societal 
and cultural models in which they are realized. This characterization of 
modernity is in accord with the multiple modernities approach, as in the 
work of S.E. Eisenstadt and Johann Arnason, but does not reduce it to a 
specific civilizational path. Additionally it gives greater recognition of 
entanglements. It is also in line with Habermas’s conception of moder-
nity in terms of communicative challenges to power. Modernity is itself 
in terms of its primary orientation a singular order of reference, which 
can also be considered to be a cognitive order that provides the basic 
design or blueprint for modern societies. The reference points that guide 
modern societies are derived from this cognitive order. The most salient 
of these are ideas of freedom, equality, autonomy, justice, the individual 
and democracy. A feature of all of these ideas is that they are open-ended 
and not necessarily mutually compatible. The diversity of projects of 
modernity is a consequence of different interpretations of these ideas and 
different combinations.
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What took place then in Europe from the eighteenth century onwards 
was the formation of specifically European cultural models that real-
ized, what Strydom has termed, the meta-cognitive order of modernity. 
The relatively early development of modernity in Europe does not mean 
that the form that modernity took defined for once and for all modernity 
in Europe nor elsewhere. The solutions varied from the early modernity 
of England in the seventeenth century to the constitutional and demo-
cratic state by the end of the nineteenth century. These different models 
of modernity were not so divergent that there was no relation between 
them, for if this were the case it would not be possible to refer to Europe 
in a meaningful sense. As we have established, from early on in the 
history of Europe certain trends can be discerned that led to similar 
outcomes, which in this analysis can be attributed to networks of com-
munication. The five significant characteristics that were identified in 
the foregoing – political fragmentation, a strong civil society tradition, 
periodic ruptures, individual and collective liberty, and the cultivation 
of a world orientation – can be seen as reflecting more general meta-
cognitive principles that give modernity a particular cultural form. In 
this view, then, some of the salient features of Europe are not them-
selves universal or define the condition of modernity. So when moder-
nity emerged it found in the structures of consciousness within Europe 
cultural models in which it could be anchored. In these instances, the 
condition of modernity is reflected in such ideas as the contestability 
of power, the questioning of the received wisdom of the past, the idea 
of freedom and cosmopolitanism. The realization of modernity in the 
cultural models that emerged in the early modern period did not confine 
modernity to those models: the framework of reference points that con-
stituted the cognitive order of modernity could never be finally settled.
The relationship between Europe and modernity can be seen in terms 
of two reference cultures: a European reference culture and the wider 
and more abstract reference culture of modernity. The latter can be seen 
as a first-order reference culture and Europe as a second-order reference 
culture. There have been many second-order reference cultures, but the 
European one had two advantages over all others. It was first of all one 
of the first globally oriented cultures and, as argued, it was a mobile cul-
ture that offered those cultures it came into contact with a set of ideas 
that were easily translatable. Not all cultures have achieved this. Two 
examples illustrate this, namely the Arab invention of numerals and, 
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more circumscribed in scope, the Chinese invention of a non-phonetic 
script, which in this case made possible the expansion of Chinese civili-
zation beyond the Han kingdom without presupposing a common spoken 
language. The European route was different in that it neither opted for 
a common language nor a common script, but a cultural predisposition 
towards self and societal transformation, which appeared to give a central 
space to the individual and to freedom. The fate of modernity was thus 
inevitably bound up with the idea of Europe. However, we should see 
that this confluence was temporary and never entirely a happy relation, 
since the modern spirit and European consciousness were often in con-
flict, as in the conflict between the ‘ancients and the moderns’ in the sev-
enteenth century and the revolutions that marked the modern era. Indeed, 
the social struggles of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the age of 
ideology, all testify to the tension between the spirit of modernity, as real-
ized in the cultural models of the age, and the concrete reality of society.
Conclusion: Europe and Modernity in a Post-European 
Age
The period in which Europe was a reference culture was relatively brief. 
It ended in 1918 in the wake of the First World War, which led to wide-
spread disillusionment by European intellectuals with the promises of 
Europe and more generally with modernity. There can be little doubt 
that 1918 was a watershed in European thought and in European poli-
tics. What followed in European thought was a turn to anti-modernism 
and scepticism about modernity. This was reflected in a mood of crisis 
and a critique of European civilization, as expressed in the turn brought 
about by Nietzsche and Heidegger and in the Spenglerian ‘decline of 
the west’ prognosis. Certain aspects of the thought of Sigmund Freud 
affirmed this transformation within European civilization. The early 
twentieth century saw the rise of other reference cultures, namely the 
United States and Russia. For much of the twentieth century, the so-
called short twentieth century, Europe was subordinated to the wider 
category of the United States-led West, which was the dominant refer-
ence culture, until it too underwent a process of fragmentation. In this 
time modernity ceased to be defined by its European form; many other 
societal variants of modernity have taken shape in what can now be 
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termed a ‘post-European’ age in the sense of a world in which Europe 
is no longer at the centre and in which Europe itself is no longer exclu-
sively defined in terms of the West, a construction that has become 
increasing problematic.
This does not mean that the European experiment with modernity 
was moribund or that the idea of Europe ceased to be of cultural or 
political significance. After 1945 the idea of Europe was rescued with 
the project of European integration. The movement that led to the 
European Union revived both the idea of Europe and a particular inter-
pretation of modernity that was strongly linked with capitalism and 
democracy, an era of democratic capitalism. However, the notion of 
Europe as a reference culture lost its normative salience. The forma-
tive period of European integration subordinated Europe to the wider 
category of the United States-led West. The dominant reference cul-
tures for much of the twentieth century were the United States and the 
Soviet Union (to which we can add fascism, which until its defeat was 
an alternative and very compelling model of modernity for elites and 
masses in Europe). In reviving the idea of Europe, the European project 
did not create a new reference culture. Although one should not neglect 
the normative salience of the EU for many other trans-national regions 
(in Asia, Africa, and Latin America), this is a relatively minor aspect of 
European integration. Indeed, the current crisis of the EU is due in no 
small part to the fact that while undermining the nation-state it has not 
overcome the nation-state. Nonetheless, it is clearly the case that the 
idea of Europe has become a cultural and political reference within the 
European area and has enjoyed considerable success, but it competes 
with many other normative orders.
If Europe is today a culture of reference, it is a much diminished one. 
Indeed, this may be the rationale for its continued relevance. However 
the fact remains that the wider world no longer looks to Europe for 
models on the governance of societies as it did in the nineteenth century.
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